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Abstract—Bot detection using machine learning (ML), with
network flow-level features, has been extensively studied in the lit-
erature. However, existing flow-based approaches typically incur
a high computational overhead and do not completely capture the
network communication patterns, which can expose additional
aspects of malicious hosts. Recently, bot detection systems which
leverage communication graph analysis using ML have gained
attention to overcome these limitations. A graph-based approach
is rather intuitive, as graphs are true representations of network
communications. In this paper, we propose a two-phased, graph-
based bot detection system which leverages both unsupervised
and supervised ML. The first phase prunes presumable benign
hosts, while the second phase achieves bot detection with high
precision. Our system detects multiple types of bots and is robust
to zero-day attacks. It also accommodates different network
topologies and is suitable for large-scale data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly, organizations are constantly under security
threats, which not only cost billions of dollars in damage
and recovery, but also detrimentally affect their reputation.
A botnet-assisted attack is a widely known threat to these
organizations. According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, “Botnets caused over $9 billion in losses to U.S.
victims and over $110 billion globally.” The most infamous
attack, Rustock, infected 1 million machines, sending up to
30 billion spam emails a day [1]. More recently, WannaCry
resulted in data breach from over 230,000 computers in 150
countries [2]. Undeniably, in the face of a cyber arms race,
attackers constantly find clever ways to sabotage networks
using botnets, most importantly via zero-day attacks [3].
A botnet is a collection of bots, agents in compromised
hosts, controlled by botmasters via command and control (C2)
channels. A malevolent adversary controls the bots through
botmaster, which could be distributed across several agents
that reside within or outside the network. Hence, bots can
be used for tasks ranging from distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS), to massive-scale spamming, to fraud and identity
theft. While bots thrive for different sinister purposes, they
exhibit a similar behavioral pattern when studied up-close. The
intrusion kill-chain [4] dictates the general phases a malicious
agent goes through in-order to reach and infest its target.
Detection of bots can be largely achieved via intrusion
detection systems (IDSs), which can be broadly classified
into signature-based and anomaly-based [5]. Signature-based
methods use pre-computed hashes of existing malware bina-
ries. They scale well and efficiently detect known threats.
However, they require frequent database updates and can be
subverted by unknown or modified attacks, such as zero-day
attacks and polymorphism [5], [6]. This undermines their suit-
ability for bot detection. Anomaly-based methods overcome
these limitations [3], [7]. They establish a baseline of normal
behavior for the protected system, and model a decision engine
that alerts on any divergence or statistical deviations from
the norm. Machine learning (ML) is an ideal technique to
automatically capture the normal behavior of a system. Its use
has boosted the scalability and accuracy of IDSs [3], [7].
An important step prior to learning, or training a ML model,
is feature extraction. These features act as discriminators
for learning and inference, reduce data dimensionality, and
increase the accuracy of ML models. The most commonly
employed features in bot detection are flow-based (e.g., source
and destination IPs, protocol, number of packets sent and/or
received, etc.). However, these features do not completely
capture the communication patterns that can expose additional
aspects of malicious hosts. In addition, flow-level models can
incur a high computational overhead, and can also be evaded
by tweaking behavioral characteristics e.g., by changing packet
structure [8].
Graph-based features, derived from flow-level information
to reflect the true behaviour of hosts, are an alternate that
overcome these limitations. We show that incorporating graph-
based features into ML yields robustness against complex
communication patterns and unknown attacks. Moreover, it
allows for cross-network ML model training and inference.
The major contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose an anomaly-based approach for bot detection
that is protocol agnostic, robust to zero-day attacks, and
suitable for large datasets.
• We show the limitations of stand-alone supervised learning.
Therefore, we employ a two-phased ML approach that
leverages both supervised and unsupervised learning. The
first phase filters presumable benign hosts. This is followed
by the second phase on the pruned hosts, to achieve bot
detection with high precision.
• We use graph-based features and evaluate various ML
techniques. The graph-based features, derived from network
flows, overcome severe topological effects that can skew bot
behavior, exacerbating ML prediction. Furthermore, these
features allow to combine data from different networks and
promote spatial stability [9] in the models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
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present a background on bot detection and highlight limitations
of the state-of-the-art. Our system design is delineated in
Section III. We discuss the results of our experiments in
Section IV. In Section V, we conclude with a summary of
our contributions and instigate future research directions.
II. RELATED WORKS
Bot(net) detection has been an active area of research and
has generated a substantial body of work. Most existing
bot detection techniques employ methods for detecting C2
channels based on the statistical features of packets and
flows [10]–[22]. Solutions like [10], [11] are focused on
specific communication protocols, such as IRC, providing
narrow-scoped solutions. On the other hand, Botminer [15]
is a protocol-independent solution, which assumes that bots
within the same botnet are characterized by similar malicious
activities and communication patterns. This assumption is an
over simplification, since botnets often randomize topologies
[5] and communication patterns as we observe in newer
malware, such as Mirai [23]. Therefore, it is evident that a non-
protocol-specific, less evadable detection method is desired.
Furthermore, [18], [22] have exploited ML-driven anomaly
detection with traffic-based statistical features, for detecting
known and unknown attacks with low error rates. How-
ever, such techniques require that all flows are compared
against each other to detect C2 traffic, which incurs a high
computational overhead. In addition, they are unreliable, as
they can be evaded with encryption and by tweaking flow
characteristics [8]. Graph-based approaches, where graphs are
extracted from network flows and host-to-host communication
patterns, overcome these limitations [8], [24]–[32]. Other
approaches [33], [34] rely on rule-based host classification
and botnet detection methods, where pre-defined thresholds
are used to discriminate between benign and suspicious hosts.
They are static and prone to evasion.
On the other hand, outlier- and anomaly-based methods are
generally more robust. BotGM [35] uses a statistical technique,
the inter-quartile method, for outlier detection. Their results
exhibit moderate accuracy with low FPs based on different
windowing parameters. However, it generates multiple graphs
from a selection of network flows. For every pair of unique
IPs, a graph is constructed, such that every node in the graph
represents a unique 2-tuple of source and destination ports,
with edges signifying the time sequence of communication.
This entails high overhead and will not scale for large datasets.
Chowdhury et al. [36] use ML for clustering the nodes
in a graph, with a focus on dimensionality and topological
characterization. Their assumption is that most benign hosts
will be grouped in the same cluster due to similar connection
patterns, hence can be eliminated from further analysis. Such
a crucial reduction in nodes effectively minimize detection
overhead. However, their graph-based features are plagued by
severe topological effects (cf., Section IV). They use statistical
means and user-centric expert opinion to tag the remaining
clusters as malicious or benign. Nevertheless, leveraging ex-
pert opinion can be cumbersome, error prone and infeasible
for large datasets.
Graph-based approaches using ML for bot detection are
intuitive and show promising results. In this paper, we pro-
pose an anomaly-, graph-based bot detection system, which
is protocol agnostic i.e., it detects bots regardless of the
protocol. We employ graph-based features in a two-phased
ML approach, which is robust to zero-day attacks, spatially
stable, and suitable for large datasets.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
Our bot detection system consists of 3 major components, as
depicted in Fig. 1. These components pertain to data prepara-
tion and feature extraction, model training, and inference.
Data Bootstrap
Model Training
Flow
Ingestion
Graph
Transform
Feature
Extraction
Feature
Normalization
Phase 1
(Unsupervised)
Phase 2
(Supervised)
InferenceHost
Benign
Bot
Fig. 1. Components of the bot detection system
A. Dataset bootstrap
1) Flow ingestion
The input to the system are bidirectional network flows.
These flows are transformed into a set T that contains 4-
tuple flows ti = {sipi, srcpktsi, dipi, dstpktsi}. Where
sipi is the source IP address that uniquely identifies a source
host, srcpktsi quantifies the number of data packets sent by
sipi to dipi, the destination host IP address. The number of
destination packets, dstpktsi, is the number of data packets
sent by dipi to sipi.
Set A is a set of tuples that have exclusive source and
destination hosts. That is, if multiple tuples have the same
source and destination hosts, they are reduced to form
an aggregated exclusive tuple ax ∈ A, such that ax =
{sipx, srcpktsx, dipx, dstpktsx}. Therefore, if two tuples
ti, tj ∈ T have the same source and destination hosts i.e.,
sipx = sipi = sipj and dipx = dipi = dipj , then number of
source and destination packets are aggregated in ax, such that
srcpktsx =
∑
tk∈T | sipx=sipk,dipx=dipk
srcpktsk (1)
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dstpktsx =
∑
tk∈T | sipx=sipk,dipx=dipk
dstpktsk. (2)
2) Graph Transform
The system creates a graph G(V, E), where V is a set of
nodes and E is a set of directed edges ei,j from node vi to
node vj with weight |ei,j |. The set of nodes V is a union of
hosts from set A, such that
V =
⋃
∀ax∈A
{sipx ∪ dipx}. (3)
For every ax ∈ A, there exist directed edges ei,j and ej,i from
vi to vj and vj to vi, respectively, such that sipx = vi and
dipx = vj . Therefore,
E =
⋃
∀ax∈A
{(sipx, dipx) ∪ (dipx, sipx)}. (4)
The weights |ei,j | and |ej,i| of edges ei,j and ej,i are srcpktsx
and dstpktsx, respectively. Moreover, if there exists a reverse
tuple ay ∈ A | dipy = vi, sipy = vj , then |ei,j | =
srcpktsx + dstpktsy and |ej,i| = dstpktsx + srcpktsy .
3) Feature Extraction
The system creates the required graph-based feature set for
the ML model. Features are intrinsic to the success of the
model that should genuinely represent and discriminate host
behavior, especially bot behavior. We study the following set
of commonly used graph-based features.
• In-Degree (ID) and Out-Degree (OD)—The in-degree, fi,0,
and out-degree, fi,1, of a node vi ∈ V are the number of
its ingress and egress edges, respectively.
F(ei,j) =
{
1, if ei,j ∈ E
0, otherwise
(5)
fi,0 =
∑
vj∈V, vi 6=vj
F(ej,i) ∀vi ∈ V (6)
fi,1 =
∑
vj∈V, vi 6=vj
F(ei,j) ∀vi ∈ V (7)
These features play an important role in the behavior of a
host. Though, a higher ID for a host makes it a point of in-
terest, often nodes with high ID offer commonly demanded
service. Therefore, observing ID alone may not signify
malicious activity. For example, a gateway is a central
point of network communication, but it is not necessarily
a malicious endpoint. Intuitively, bots attempting to infect
the network will tend to have higher ID than benign hosts.
Similarly, OD is also an intrinsic feature. Typically, in the
reconnaissance stage of the intrusion kill-chain, bots attempt
to mass-survey the network, which can be captured via OD.
• In-Degree Weight (IDW) and Out-Degree Weight (ODW)—
These features augment the ID and OD of the nodes in the
graph. The in-degree weight, fi,2, and the out-degree weight,
fi,3, of a node vi ∈ V is the sum of all the weights of its
incoming and outgoing edges, respectively.
fi,2 =
∑
vj∈V, vi 6=vj , ej,i∈E
|ej,i| ∀vi ∈ V (8)
fi,3 =
∑
vj∈V, vi 6=vj , ei,j∈E
|ei,j | ∀vi ∈ V (9)
For a fine-grained differentiation, it is important to expose
features that will eventually bring bots closer to each other,
and discriminate bots from hosts. IDW and ODW features
add another layer of information, further alienating the
malicious hosts from the benign. Similar to ID, mass-data
leeching bots will tend to expose a high IDW in the action
phase of the intrusion kill-chain. Similarly, the ODW is the
aggregate data packets a node has sent, which can potentially
expose bots that mass-send payloads to hosts in a network.
• Betweenness Centrality (BC)—The betweenness centrality
of a node vi ∈ V , inspired from social network analysis, is
a measure of the number of shortest paths that pass through
it, such that
fi,4 =
∑
vj ,vk∈V, vi 6=vj 6=vk
σvjvk(vi)
σvjvk
∀vi ∈ V. (10)
Where σvjvk is the total number of shortest paths between
node pairs vj , vk ∈ V , and σvjvk(vi) is the number
of shortest paths that pass through vi. This feature has a
high computational overhead with O(|V |.|E|+|V |2. log |V |)
time complexity [37]. However, it can alienate bots early
on as they attempt their first connections. This is when
the bots exhibit low IDW and ODW. Thus, it would be
more favorable for the shortest paths in the network to
pass through the host. Likewise, when the IDW and ODW
increase, the BC of a node decreases immensely, as it is less
favored for being included in shortest paths.
• Local Clustering Coefficient (LCC)—Unlike BC, local
clustering coefficient has a lower computational overhead,
and it quantifies the neighborhood connectivity of a node
vi ∈ V , such that
fi,5 =
∑
vj ,vk∈Ni, vi 6=vj 6=vk F(ej,k)
|Ni|(|Ni| − 1) ∀vi ∈ V (11)
Where Ni is neighborhood set for vi, ∀vj ∈ Ni | ei,j ∈
E ∨ ej,i ∈ E. LCC feature can play an important role
in discriminating malicious host’s behavior. Successfully
infected hosts tend to exhibit a higher LCC, as bots often
deploy collaborative P2P techniques, making its adjacent
host pairs strongly connected.
• Alpha Centrality (AC)—Alpha centrality, also inspired from
social network analysis, is a feature that generalizes the
centrality of a node vi ∈ V . AC extends the Eigenvector
centrality (EC), with the addition that nodes are also in-
fluenced by external sources. These external sources can be
user-defined, according to their graphical analysis technique.
In EC, each vi is assigned an influence score xi, that is
iteratively exchanged with adjacent nodes. In essence, EC
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is the relative weight of a node in the graph, such that
connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the
score of vi. Hence, AC is given as
fi,6 = αA
T
i xi + ei ∀vi ∈ V. (12)
Where Ai is the adjacency matrix, ei is the external influ-
ence of node vi, and α is influence factor that controls focus
between external sources to internal influence. AC is impor-
tant for intermediate and terminal phases of the intrusion
kill-chain. Early on, it may be negligible. However, as time
progresses and bots perform more actions in the network,
their AC will gradually increase, making it discriminative.
4) Feature Normalization (F-Norm)
Topological alterations can severely affect the host’s behav-
ior and pattern of communication in the graph. For example,
in Fig. 2, g acts as a gateway for host h2 to communicate
with the rest of the network (i.e., hosts h3, h4 and h5). In this
configuration, h2 carries an ID of 2. In contrast, Fig. 3 shows
the topology without a gateway, where h2 communicates with
other hosts in the network individually. This boosts the ID
of host h2 to 4. To alleviate this adverse effect of different
network topologies, we normalize the above base features to
incorporate neighborhood relativity.
h1 h2 g h3
h4 h5
Fig. 2. Example topology of benign hosts with a gateway
h1 h2 h3
h4 h5
Fig. 3. Example topology of benign hosts without a gateway
To control the overhead of computing these normalized
features, the neighborhood set Ni for vi ∈ V is restricted
to a depth D. The mean of j features for vi across its
neighbors vk ∈ Ni are computed. Each feature for vi is then
normalized by incorporating neighborhood relativity. Thus,
features relative to their neighborhood mean is given as
µi,m =
∑
vk∈Ni fk,m
|Ni| ∀vi ∈ V, 0 ≤ m ≤ j (13)
fi,m =
fi,m
µi,m
∀vi ∈ V, 0 ≤ m ≤ j. (14)
After normalizing the features (with D = 2) for h2 and h4
with gateway, their IDs change from 2 to 0.8 and 3 to 1.1,
respectively. Without the gateway, their IDs change from 4 to
1.6 and 3 to 1.1, respectively. As aforementioned, normaliza-
tion attempts to make hosts of the same nature look similar,
making the topological alterations less severe. Similarly, in
situations where network data is recorded over varying time
intervals, IDW and ODW tend to increase substantially with
larger time intervals. By normalizing features, the effect of
time also diminishes.
B. Model Training
The model is trained to accept graph-based features as input
and learn to distinguish between malicious and benign hosts.
Two learning phases are involved as explained below.
1) Phase 1
The first ML phase performs unsupervised learning (UL)
to cluster the hosts. Generally, benign hosts exhibit similar
behavior that can be gauged by the graph-based features.
These hosts exhibit resembling patterns in data, such as
sending (OD/ODW) and receiving (ID/IDW) similar number
of packets [36]. Since BC, LCC and AC are directly affected
by these traits, their influence can be similar for all benign
hosts. This may maximize the size of the benign cluster.
This phase not only acts as a first filter for new hosts,
but also significantly reduces the training data for the second
phase. If a host is clustered into the benign cluster, then it
is strictly benign. However, it is important to note that a
malicious host can also be incorrectly clustered into a benign
cluster, adversely affecting system performance. Although the
objective is to maximize the size of the benign cluster, it
is essential to jointly minimize the number of bots that are
co-located in this cluster. Various UL techniques can be
deployed in this phase, including k-Means, Density-Based
Spatial Clustering (DBScan) and Self-Organizing Map (SOM).
However, the classifier with the best assignment must be
selected, according to the objective outlined in this phase.
[f0, f1, f2, ..., fj ]i
Phase 1
HOB?
Phase 2
Bot Benign
Yes
No
Fig. 4. Flowchart of node classification with i nodes and j features
2) Phase 2
Phase 1 separates the dataset between hosts that are inside
and outside the benign cluster. All the hosts, ideally a small
number, that reside outside the benign cluster are an input to
Phase 2 for further classification. Optimally, all bots should be
outside the benign cluster, regardless of whether or not they
are co-located in the same cluster. Depending on the number
of hosts outside the benign cluster, supervised learning (SL)
classifiers in this phase will exhibit varying results.
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The primary objective in this phase is to maximize recall
i.e., how many bots do not go unnoticed. It is proportional to
the number of true positives (TPs) and inversely proportional
to FNs. Various SL classifiers can be deployed to achieve
this objective, such as logistic regression (LR), support vector
machine (SVM), feed-forward neural network (FNN) and
decision tree (DT). The objective from Phase 1 i.e., minimize
hosts outside the benign cluster (HOB), while maximizing bots
outside the benign cluster (BOB), results in a minimal training
dataset for Phase 2. Also, the resultant training dataset from
Phase 1 is expected to be unbalanced, with a bias towards
benign hosts. This may prove problematic for LR, SVM and
FNN in achieving high recall rates.
C. Inference
Once the models are trained, the system is deployed to perform
bot detection. Ideally, the system must allow for two modes
of execution: (i) model (re)training, to adjust to the dynamics
of the network, and (ii) inference, i.e., to predict whether
or not a given host is a bot. The inference unfolds in two
steps—presumable benign hosts get filtered out in Phase 1 as
they get assigned to the benign cluster, and suspicious hosts,
assigned to a different cluster, are further classified in Phase 2.
Fig. 4 captures the inner workings of node classification. To
preserve consistency, the deployed system must synchronize
and execute requests in order of observation.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the proposed bot detection system on a Hadoop
cluster. In this section, we detail the experimental setup and
the results of our evaluation.
A. Environment Setup
1) Hardware
We experiment on a Hadoop cluster that consists of a
management node (2x Intel Xeon Silver 4114; 192 GB RAM),
a compute node (2x Intel Xeon Gold 5120; 384 GB RAM) and
four data nodes (2x Intel Xeon Silver 4114; 192 GB RAM). A
25Gbit and 10Gbit physical networks are deployed, intercon-
necting the nodes. The former network is primarily used for
data and applications, while the latter is for administration.
2) Software
The software implementation is primarily based on Java.
To ease dependency management, the project incorporates
Gradle [38]. JGraphT [39] graph library is used to construct
the graph and extract graph-based features from network flows.
Both Smile [40] and Encog [41] are used in tandem for
ML. In order to support rapid prototyping, a custom in-house
DataFrame (DF) library has been developed. DF conforms
to the incremental streaming paradigms, data streams with
well-defined source, pipelines and sinks. Furthermore, the
underlying data structures are immutable and all the basic
stream-based transformations are available.
B. Dataset
Our evaluation is based on the CTU-13 [42] dataset. CTU-
13 comprises of 13 different subset datasets (DS) that include
captures from 7 distinct malware, performing port scanning,
DDoS, click fraud, spamming, etc. Every subset carries a
TABLE I
CTU-13 DATASET
DS Duration # Flows Bot # Bots
1 6.15 2824637 Neris 1
2 4.21 1808123 Neris 1
3 66.85 4710639 Rbot 1
4 4.21 1121077 Rbot 1
5 11.63 129833 Virut 1
6 2.18 558920 Menti 1
7 0.38 114078 Sogou 1
8 19.5 2954231 Murlo 1
9 5.18 2753885 Neris 10
10 4.75 1309792 Rbot 10
11 0.26 107252 Rbot 3
12 1.21 325472 NSIS.ay 3
13 16.36 1925150 Virut 1
unique network topology with a certain number of bots that
leverage different protocols. Table I summarizes the dataset
duration, number of flows and bots, and the type of bot in
every subset. CTU-13 labels indicate whether a flow is from/to
botnet, background or benign. Therefore, known infected hosts
are labeled as bots and remaining hosts as benign. We leverage
12 datasets as base training data, while a single dataset, #9, is
left out for testing purpose. This test dataset contains NetFlow
data collected from a Neris botnet, 10 unique hosts labeled
as bots, performing multiple actions. We use this dataset
configuration for training and testing, unless stated otherwise.
C. Results and Discussion
1) Graph Transform, Feature Extraction & Normalization
For every subset in the CTU-13 dataset, the system first
ingests all the network flows, creates the graph, extracts base
features and normalizes them. For each dataset, Table II
highlights the graph creation time i.e., graph transform (GT),
number of graph nodes (|V |), total runtime to extract only
base BC feature and all base features (FE), and total runtime
to normalize features (F-Norm).
TABLE II
GRAPH TRANSFORM, BASE FEATURE EXTRACTION AND
NORMALIZATION COMPUTATION
DS GT Nodes BC FE F-Norm
(seconds) (hours) (hours) (seconds)
1 9 606829 24.12 24.121 11.3
2 6 441845 10.387 10.624 7.9
3 21 434489 9.463 9.713 13.755
4 5 185742 1.37 1.431 6.307
5 1 41548 0.057 0.06 0.556
6 3 107056 0.28 0.295 2.112
7 1 38081 0.021 0.022 0.488
8 13 383339 9.67 9.954 9.617
9 10 366881 8.677 8.97 7.879
10 7 197542 1.06 1.108 4.861
11 1 41809 0.055 0.057 0.627
12 2 94164 0.287 0.302 1.412
13 9 315343 3.667 3.852 6.824
It is evident that there is a non-linear relationship between
BC and the number of nodes in the graph. Furthermore, the
inconsistent variation between GT and the number of nodes
is due to the differing time windows across datasets. Also,
dataset #3 has a much higher number of flows than #2, which
increases the runtime of graph creation. This is primarily due
to the repeated modification of exclusive flow tuples in set A.
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The system then normalizes the base features, and Table II
depicts its total runtime with D = 1. Evidently, normalizing
features does not significantly increase the total runtime of
the system. The largest runtime reported for the most complex
dataset is 13.755 seconds.
2) Stand-alone SL
We start by highlighting the limitations of a stand-alone
supervised learning approach. This consists of evaluating su-
pervised ML classifiers, including DT, LR, SVM and FNN for
bot detection. Each classifier employs graph-based normalized
features and is trained on the entire training dataset. In our
experiments, DT uses the Gini instance split rule algorithm,
LR is used without regularization, and SVM uses the Gaussian
kernel with a soft margin penalty of 1. Moreover, NN is
configured to use cross entropy as an error function and 10
hidden layers of 1000 units each. Table III highlights the
results, where LR and DT show meaningful classification.
Both LR and DT classifiers result in a 100% recall, with
91% and 83% precision, respectively. With LR’s superiority
in precision, it seems to be the classifier of choice. The other
classifiers were able to accurately classify all the benign hosts,
but failed to identify any bots.
TABLE III
SUPERVISED LEARNING WITH F-NORM
Classifier TP FP TN FN Recall Precision
DT 10 2 366869 0 100 83
LR 10 1 366870 0 100 91
SVM 0 0 366871 10 0 0
FNN 0 0 366871 10 0 0
We then evaluate the training time and robustness of the
stand-alone classifiers, as depicted in Tables IV and V. DT
requires the least training time of 4.9 seconds, which is in
high contrast to the 58.2 seconds for LR. That is, DT requires
only 8.4% of LR’s training time for the entire training dataset.
It is also essential for a bot detection system to detect bots that
the classifier has never seen before i.e., unknown or zero-day
attacks. Therefore, to evaluate robustness to zero-day attacks,
we change the selection of the training and testing datasets.
We choose dataset #6 for testing, which has a unique bot that
is not present in any other dataset. The remaining datasets
are aggregated to form the training set, with 34 bots and a
total of ≈3.1M hosts. Evidently, DT outperforms LR, which
misclassifies a benign host, with a low precision of 50%.
TABLE IV
TRAINING TIME OF SUPERVISED ML CLASSIFIERS
Classifier Training Time (s)
DT 4.9
LR 58.2
SVM 6832.3
FNN 5.7
TABLE V
SUPERVISED LEARNING AGAINST PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN BOT
Classifier TP FP TN FN Recall Precision
DT 1 0 107055 0 100 100
LR 1 1 107054 0 100 50
SVM 0 0 107055 1 0 0
FNN 0 0 107055 1 0 0
Based on the above evaluations, LR outperforms DT in pre-
cision, while DT shows a superior training time and robustness
to unknown attacks. However, precision, training time and
robustness are all crucial for our bot detection system. Can
we achieve the best of all three? To investigate this, we set
out to evaluate a two-phased system that employs an initial
clustering phase (UL), followed by a classification phase (SL).
We delineate its evaluation in the following subsections.
3) Phase 1 (UL)
For this phase of the system, we evaluate three UL tech-
niques, namely k-Means, DBScan and SOM. However, DB-
Scan results are inconclusive, where bots co-located with
benign hosts. In essence, DBScan does not produce a single,
prevalent benign cluster. DBScan is evaluated with varying
minimum number of neighborhood points (minPts) and dis-
tance (). Multiple  values are tested in the range of [10-5,
10-4, ..., 105]. Also, we infer  values that correspond to the
boundary of the bots themselves. We vary minPts in [1, 2,
..., 25] depending on the number of bots in the aggregated
training dataset. However, maximal separation of bots from
benign hosts could not be achieved with the tested parameters.
On the other hand, both k-Means and SOM show apprecia-
ble results, where SOM is trained with a learning rate of 0.7.
Tables VI and VII highlight the evaluation metrics, including
number of clusters or neurons, number of hosts outside the
benign cluster (HOB), percentage of hosts outside the benign
cluster relative to the total number of hosts (HOB%), number
of bots outside the benign cluster (BOB), and percentage of
bots relative to the total number of bots (BOB%).
Recall, the dataset #9 is removed for testing, which includes
10 hosts labeled as bots and ≈366K hosts. Also, ≈3.2M hosts
from the remaining datasets are used to train the classifiers.
In comparison to the number of clusters for k-Means, SOM is
able to alienate its first bot outside the benign cluster with
a lower number of neurons (9 vs. 16). With 81 neurons,
SOM has a recall rate of 92%, with k-Means achieving 42%.
However, k-Means catches up with 121 clusters. Nevertheless,
SOM outperforms k-Means by maximizing the number of bots
isolated with a smaller number of neurons.
TABLE VI
k-MEANS CLUSTERING WITH F-NORM
# of Clusters HOB HOB% BOB BOB%
4 5 0.0002 0 0
9 12 0.0004 0 0
16 36 0.0012 1 4
25 94 0.0033 6 24
36 170 0.0059 6 24
49 473 0.0164 8 32
64 1071 0.0371 10 40
81 1133 0.0392 10 40
100 3028 0.1049 21 87.5
121 26935 0.9327 24 96
144 27100 0.9384 24 96
169 27302 0.9454 24 96
196 27359 0.9474 24 96
225 28752 0.9956 24 96
With a cluster size of 100, k-Means alienates 21 bots, while
having an outside host sum of 3028 for the remaining non-
benign clusters. In contrast, SOM removes 23 bots from the
benign cluster with an outside host sum of 3675. The very
next k-Means cluster size i.e., 121, boosts HOB from 3028
to 26935, while SOM remains at a close 3894. However, k-
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TABLE VII
SOM CLUSTERING WITH F-NORM
# of Neurons HOB HOB% BOB BOB%
4 10 0.0004 0 0
9 29 0.0010 1 4
16 49 0.0017 1 4
25 113 0.0039 6 24
36 286 0.0099 7 28
49 556 0.0193 8 32
64 1709 0.0592 10 40
81 3524 0.1222 23 92
100 3675 0.1274 23 92
121 3894 0.1350 23 92
144 27591 0.9647 24 96
169 27856 0.9740 24 96
196 28342 0.9912 24 96
225 28449 0.9950 24 96
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Fig. 5. Comparison of SOM and k-Means with respect to training time
Means isolates three extra bots, yielding 24 BOB for 26935
HOB. That is, three extra bots were detected for a ≈23K
increase in HOB. Recall, our objective in this phase is to
jointly minimize HOB while maximizing BOB. Therefore,
SOM with 100 neurons becomes the natural choice.
With respect to runtime, k-Means mostly outperforms SOM,
as depicted in Fig. 5. With 100 clusters, k-Means took 16.8
seconds to train, in comparison to 47.1 seconds of SOM.
We speculate that SOM’s ever increasing training time is
contributed to how it updates the surrounding neurons. As the
number of neurons increases, the density of their neighborhood
increases. Eventually, more neurons will tend to be within
the threshold radius. Nevertheless, with recall being our top
priority, we leverage SOM as the UL classifier in Phase 1.
4) Phase 2 (SL)
The training set for Phase 2 is determined by the number
of hosts outside the benign cluster in Phase 1. These are the
relevant hosts for this phase, as hosts that are assigned in the
benign cluster never make it to Phase 2. With a 10×10 (i.e.,
100 neurons) SOM and normalized features in Phase 1, the
size of the dataset is significantly reduced. Therefore, we have
3675 HOB, including 23 bots, for classification in Phase 2.
TABLE VIII
SUPERVISED LEARNING WITH F-NORM
Classifier TP FP TN FN Recall Precision
DT 10 1 366870 0 100 90.9
LR 0 0 366871 10 0 0
SVM 0 0 366871 10 0 0
FNN 0 0 366871 10 0 0
For this phase of the system, we evaluate four SL tech-
niques, namely DT, LR, SVM and FNN. The DT classifier
shows the best performance with the small dataset, as depicted
in Table VIII. It successfully detects all bots in the test dataset,
with only a single FP out of the 366871 benign hosts. In
contrast, all other classifiers are lackluster and unable to recall
even a single bot from the dataset. We believe this is because
all classifiers, except DT, rely on gradient-descent for error-
correction. This implies that every single node in the dataset
will affect the end-hypothesis function. Thus, with a dataset
that is unbalanced, the hypothesis will be biased towards the
benign hosts, which is the case for LR, SVM and FNN.
Table IX highlights the training time for the supervised
classifiers. For Phase 1, a 10×10 SOM incurs a training time
of 47.1 seconds, while DT has the lowest training time of
88 milliseconds in Phase 2. Thus, the aggregate training time
for both phases is ≈47.2 seconds. This is an 11 seconds
improvement over the 58.2 seconds previously observed for
a stand-alone LR classifier.
TABLE IX
TRAINING TIME OF SUPERVISED CLASSIFIERS ON THE PRUNED DATASET
Classifier Training Time (ms)
DT 88
LR 2454
SVM 864
NN 22
Using dataset #6 for testing, the robustness test harbors
more hosts for training in Phase 2. Most importantly, there are
more BOBs (i.e., 32) and relatively the same HOBs, yielding
a higher ratio of bots to hosts outside the benign cluster. The
robustness results are portrayed in Table V. Though LR is
able to recall the malicious bot while incurring only a single
FP, DT exhibits perfect results on this specific test dataset.
It is able to detect the previously unknown bot, as well as
correctly classify all the benign hosts. Therefore, with SOM
selected for Phase 1 and DT for Phase 2, the system ensures
minimal training time and robustness to unknown attacks, with
high recall and precision.
5) Feature Normalization
Recall that aggregating datasets from different networks can
negatively impact the base features, thus compromising system
performance. Essentially, the topological structure of different
networks affect the extracted graphical features, greatly skew-
ing bot pattern and behavior. Thus, the intuition behind feature
normalization is to make hosts, including bots, from different
datasets look alike.
Table X showcase the crucial depreciation of the SOM
results without normalizing graph-based features. For example,
with 81 neurons, SOM with and without F-Norm scores
92% and 60% on BOB, respectively. On average, the results
without F-Norm have a higher HOB. This intrinsic observation
signifies the lack of similarity between hosts of the same
category. For example, benign hosts from different networks
are not co-located due to the stark differences in their features.
Conversely, with F-Norm, similarly labeled hosts are more
frequently co-located, yielding better BOB and HOB. Hence,
normalized graph-based features significantly improve the
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spatial stability of ML in the bot detection system.
TABLE X
SOM CLUSTERING WITHOUT F-NORM
# of Neurons HOB HOB% BOB BOB%
4 8 0.0003 0 0
9 39 0.0014 0 0
16 689 0.0239 0 0
25 935 0.324 0 0
36 2280 0.0790 9 36
49 3792 0.1315 11 44
64 4207 0.1459 14 56
81 6721 0.2333 15 60
100 8465 0.2940 22 88
121 12923 0.4495 24 96
144 20780 0.7248 24 96
169 22607 0.7890 24 96
196 23714 0.8280 24 96
225 42125 1.4803 24 96
For 100 neurons, SOM with F-Norm results in 23 BOB and
3675 HOB. Without F-Norm, it results in 22 BOB and 8465
HOB, as shown in Figures 6 and 7. Thus, for the same number
of neurons, feature normalization was able to maximize BOB,
while minimizing HOB. Therefore, we choose 100 neurons
with F-Norm as our primary configuration for SOM.
6) Feature Engineering
It is important to gauge the significance and impact of
the graph-based features on the hybrid bot detection system.
Albeit different feature combinations may impact results, are
all features necessary? Table XI shows the Pearson’s feature
correlation matrix for the normalized graph-based features. At
a glance, we can determine that the first five features are highly
correlated, with a correlation close to or greater than 0.9.
Therefore, feature combinations that exclude some of these
features may not exacerbate classification accuracy. On the
other hand, the last two features are highly uncorrelated, with
LCC being the least correlated. Hence, we start with removing
IDW and ODW, which slightly decreases the benign cluster
size by ≈24K hosts but adds 1 more BOB. However, the
performance of the SL classifiers suffer when we eliminate
IDW and ODW features. Precision drops to 52.6% for DT
from 90.9% (cf., Table VIII). Also, LR now misclassifies two
benign hosts as bots.
A weakness of the chosen features is the runtime of BC. For
the first dataset, it took over 24 hours to compute BC. This will
impede any effort to expedite the learning process. Without
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TABLE XI
PEARSON’S FEATURE CORRELATION MATRIX WITH F-NORM
ID IDW OD ODW BC LCC AC
ID 1 0.99 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.03 0.32
IDW 0.99 1 0.91 0.96 0.97 0.03 0.33
OD 0.92 0.91 1 0.89 0.90 0.08 0.37
ODW 0.95 0.96 0.89 1 0.97 0.04 0.43
BC 0.96 0.97 0.90 0.97 1 0.01 0.46
LCC 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.01 1 0.01
AC 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.46 0.01 1
BC, SOM maintains similar performance. However, removing
BC from the feature set adversely affects the precision of DT,
dropping to 62.5%. SOM without BC performs identical to
the use of the entire feature set. In contrast, DT’s precision is
affected by the removal of BC, but it is better than that of the
removal of IDW and ODW. While the precision deteriorated,
only 6 and 9 benign hosts were misclassified out of the ≈367K
hosts with the removal of BC and IDW/ODW, respectively.
This reinforces the correlation matrix i.e., having these features
the most correlated. Since recall and precision are sought after
metrics in our system, it is important to include these features
for training and testing classifiers.
V. CONCLUSION
The struggle to detect malicious agents in a network has
recently converged to ML. High FPs and FNs are detrimental
to any intrusion detection system. Network-based approaches
exhibit plausible detection rates. When paired with a proper
modeling technique, such as graphs, high detection accuracy
can be achieved with low FPs. In this paper, we propose a
two-phased, graph-based bot detection system that leverages
both supervised and unsupervised learning.
Using SOM, Phase 1 establishes a compromise between
maximizing the benign cluster and alienating the malicious
bots. Furthermore, the results of Phase 2 favor DT, showcas-
ing high TPs and low FPs. Moreover, feature normalization
significantly improves the spatial stability of the models. The
system is robust against unknown attacks and cross-network
ML model training and inference. It detects bots that rely on
different protocols and is suitable for large-scale data.
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